Constitution are for the future of the EU. As Alberta Sbragia points out, the European Union is still going about its daily business "putting forth proposals to keep the Doha Round alive, continuing to negotiate a major trade agreement with Mercosur in South America, keeping peacekeeping troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina" (2006, 237) . To be sure, this is largely due to the degree to which the new Constitution represented an amalgamation of previous treaties. However, given that some of the most important features of the new agreement addressed voting procedures for the enlarged European Union, it is less clear whether the failure to implement the Constitution will become less symbolic and more practical in the near future (Sbragia, 238 ). Raney concludes that feelings of attachment to one's own country do not necessarily impede the degree to which individuals "feel close to Europe." Those who responded to the question "How close do you feel to Europe" were also those who felt the most proud of their own national identity. Surprisingly, those who proclaimed that religion and ancestry were important features of national identities were also more likely to have a closer attachment to Europe. These findings held irrespective of age, gender, education, and employment. However, an important caveat does appear: those who are less fearful of immigration are also more likely to feel closer to Europe. Raney thus points out that there appears to be two different visions of Europe: one based upon a civic nationalism and one based upon an ethnic nationalism.
Thus, she argues that identity is not a zero sum game. Instead, it is possible to possess multiple identities. This implies that a significant portion of EU citizens feel that Raney's findings also point to the link between non-civic forms of national belonging and fears of immigration. Given the degree to which radical right parties, such as the Front National, actively oppose and even campaigned against the European Constitution, there is a tangible link between issues of immigration, exclusion, and national identity. Similarly, the process of state formation and questions of nationalism, citizenship, and belonging inevitably leads to questions of inclusion, exclusion, and national minorities. This is no more prevalent than in the former Eastern Europe where countries such as the Czech Republic, Romania, and the former Yugoslavia attempt to consolidate their national identities while also attempting to comply with the process of European integration. The discourse of what it means to be European, how to maintain one's own national identity, and how to recognize the difference of others become particularly important within the difficult process of identity formation. However, as European history has taught us, and as recent debates concerning immigration continue to warn us, it is not clear that being "European" leads to inclusive notions of belonging. Europe's other is not only found in its growing immigrant populations. Rather, especially in Eastern Europe, the exclusion of the Roma represent both a threat to the nation project, while it also calls the European Union claims to inclusion, democracy, and multiculturalism into question. Thus, debates about what it means to be European are by no means confined to the West, or the old member states.
If the three authors presented here are correct, nation-states not only matter but they can also facilitate European integration. However, the question remains: How should and how will the process of European integration proceed? Will further integration become more elite driven? Or will it become more inclusive and democratic? TeslerMabe and Raney claim that a more democratic and legitimate form of integration must not exclude the nation-state. Nation-states are important sources of identity formation, they act as democratic controls on European elites, and, maybe most importantly, they are not incompatible with European integration. However, as Raney and Young warn us, this
